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Should a central bank accommodate energy price shocks? Should the central bank use
core in
ation or headline in
ation with the volatile energy component in its Taylor rule? In
order to answer these questions we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with energy use, durable goods and nominal rigidities to study the eects of an
energy price shock and its impact on the macroeconomy when the central bank follows a
Taylor rule. We then study how the economy performs under alternative parameterizations
of the rule with dierent weights on headline and core in
ation after an increase in the
energy price. Our simulation results indicate that a central bank using core in
ation in its
Taylor rule does better than one using headline in
ation because the output drop is less
severe. In general, we show that the lower the weight on energy price in
ation in the Taylor
rule, the lower the impact is of an energy price increase on GDP and in
ation.
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Should a central bank accommodate energy price shocks? Should the central bank use core
in
ation or headline in
ation with its volatile energy component if it follows a Taylor rule?
In order to answer these questions we study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with energy price shocks in the presence of money, nominal rigidities and durable goods
investment. Additionally, this model has energy use at both the rm and the household level as
in Dhawan and Jeske (2006). We introduce a generalized Taylor rule that explicitly distinguishes
between core and energy price in
ation. We use this model to study the eects of an energy price
shock on the economy in the presence of alternative parameterizations of the monetary policy
rule.
We nd that the central bank cannot completely shield the economy from an energy price
spike. However, a central bank using core in
ation explicitly in its Taylor rule does better than
the one using headline in
ation because the output drop is less severe. In general, we show that
the lower the weight on the energy price in
ation in the Taylor rule, the lower the impact is of
energy price shocks on GDP and in
ation. This result appears contrary to conventional wisdom
in monetary economics, whereby a policy that accommodates oil price shocks is actually counter-
productive, as in Leduc and Sill (2004) who state that \[e]asy in
ation policies are seen to to
amplify the impacts of oil price shocks on output and in
ation"(p. 806). However, our result is
not contradicting the previous research. In fact, we replicate the results in Leduc and Sill (2004)
that with low levels of nominal rigidities, a policy rule with more weight on the output gap or a
lower weight on the core in
ation exacerbates the output drop and the in
ation spike following
an energy price hike.1 We simply show that the central bank can \accommodate" in
ation as
long as that refers to energy price in
ation only.
Our results also vindicate the work of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) who claim that
the Federal Reserve should have been less aggressive in responding to energy price hikes in the
1970s, which would have stabilized in
ation without jeopardizing economic growth. Their paper
was criticized for its reduced-form vector auto-regressions (VARs) methodology, that is subject
to the Lucas Critique because any change in the monetary policy rule would trigger a change in
the underlying parameters of that VAR model.2 Our model, however, shows that even within a
rational expectations framework the central bank can indeed accommodate an in
ationary shock
as long as the accommodation comes in the form of low or even negative weights on the energy
price in
ation while staying vigilant on core in
ation.
1However, we do show that with more wage and price rigidity we can reverse that result. Specically, the
output drop under easy monetary policy (lower weight on in
ation or higher weight on the output gap) can
cushion the output drop.
2Zha (1999) and Hamilton and Herrera (2004) also criticize their VARs for misspecication.
1Our results are similar in spirit to the work of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006a) who show
that temporarily accommodating an energy price hike softens the output drop. This policy is
not counter-productive the way Leduc and Sill (2004) showed, because the the central bank
leaves the coecients in the Taylor rule unchanged but temporarily deviates from the rule. The
dierence between our work and Carlstrom and Fuerst is that we incorporate the accommodation
explicitly through an additional term for energy price in
ation in the Taylor rule.3
Following Leduc and Sill (2004), the nominal rigidities on the consumer side are modeled
in the form of a cash in advance constraint with adjustment costs for changing nominal wages.
On the producer side, rms in the intermediate goods sector face adjustment costs for their
nominal price. Also, rms have to borrow funds to nance their payroll. A major dierence
from Leduc and Sill's specication is that we introduce durable goods investment and energy
use at the household level as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006). Another feature of our model is
that we introduce energy use directly in the production function where capital and energy are
complements, as in Kim and Loungani (1992) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006a), unlike Leduc
and Sill (2004) who tie energy use to capacity utilization.
As in Dhawan and Jeske (2006), the drop in GDP after an energy price hike is smaller in
an economy with durable goods than in one without them. This is due to a portfolio rebal-
ancing eect whereby the representative consumer lowers durables investment more than xed
investment, which cushions the drop in output. We can see a 
avor of this rebalancing action in
Figure 1, which plots empirical impulse response functions (IRFs) after a one standard deviation
shock to the energy price.4 Durable goods investment drops immediately after the energy price
shock while xed investment actually increases slightly for a while and then drops and by a lower
magnitude than durable goods investment.5 We show that this rebalancing eect plays a major
role in our results. Specically, we show that a Taylor rule with headline in
ation impedes this
rebalancing and thus causes larger output drops. In contrast, if the central bank puts a low
(potentially negative) weight on energy in
ation it enhances the rebalancing and thus cushions
the drop in output.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, section 3 goes through the
calibration and estimation used to parameterize our model, section 4 shows the numerical results,
both in the baseline economy as well as under dierent policy rules and section 5 concludes.
3This idea of a generalized Taylor rule is similar to the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) who add
an extra term for the asset price change to the Taylor rule to study the role of monetary policy in an economy
with asset price shocks.
4We use quarterly data from 1970:1 to 2006:4 from the BEA. Core in
ation refers to changes in the de
ator of
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) outside of energy. The energy price refers to the price of PCE energy
relative to non-energy PCE goods and services.




There is a measure one of households indexed by i 2 [0;1]: Households have preferences over













i;t is a consumption aggregator and Hi;t are hours worked. CA consists of three goods;
nondurables and services excluding energy (N), the 
ow of services from the stock of durables









i;t + (1   ')log(1   Hi;t) (2)
where ' 2 (0;1) and H denotes hours worked. This log-utility specication is the same as in
Kim and Loungani (1992).
As in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) we choose the following functional form for the aggregator
















Notice the timing of the durables stock. We index each variable by the time period its level was
set. The stock of durables evolves according to:
Di;t = (1   d)Di;t 1 + Id;i;t (4)













In the labor market households are monopolistically competitive. Total labor services Ht available












































Let Pt be the core price level in period t and t = Pt=Pt 1 be the gross core in
ation rate.













where   is steady state in
ation. Households begin every period with Mi;t 1 dollars carried over
from last period. They make a deposit of DPi;t at the intermediary and use the remaining money
balance to nance all consumption expenditures. This induces the cash in advance constraint:










t is the relative price of energy. Notice that our denition of core price is slightly
dierent from what is normally used in that the food component included in N is part of our
core price. Food prices, of course, are excluded in the both the core PCE de
ator and the core
CPI index. Since most of the variance in headline in
ation is due to energy rather than food
price 
uctuations, however, we argue that our core index is a good enough approximation for
the real world core price index.6
6For example, the correlation between PCE ex food and energy and PCE ex energy was 0.9637 between 1970Q1
and 2006Q4. What's more, food prices have become less volatile over time: between the years 2000 and 2006,
food price 
uctuations account for only about 1.4 percent of the variation in the dierence between core and
headline in
ation.































i;t is the real dividend from the rm and b
i;t is the nominal dividend from the nancial
intermediary. Also notice that the deposits that the household made at the beginning of the
period pay o at the end of the period, including interest. They add to the end-of period money
stock.
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Di;t = (1   d)Di;t 1 + Id;i;t (17)
2.2 Financial Intermediary
As in Leduc and Sill (2004), the nancial intermediary takes deposits from households, receives
money injections Xt from the central bank and loans funds to the rm. That way the money








We assume that all goods are produced in one single sector.7 The nal good Yt is produced in a
competitive market by aggregating intermediate goods Yj;t of a measure one of monopolistically








































In what follows, when we talk about rms we mean the intermediate goods producers, not the
























where Z is an aggregate shock to productivity, Hj are hours employed in production, Kj;t 1 is
capital and Ef;j;t is rm energy use.8
7Barsky, House and Kimball (2005), Erceg and Levin (2006) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006b) use a sticky
price model where durable goods are produced in a separate sector. In a two sector model we would be able to
study the relative price movement of durables versus non-durable goods after an energy price shock. We refer
this to future research.
8This setup is dierent from the model in Aoki (2000) who studies how the central bank should respond to
relative price changes. In Aoki's model the good with the 
exible price, which he interprets as energy does not
6Capital evolves according to:
Kj;t = (1   k)Kj;t 1 + Ik;j;t (25)
where Ik;j;t stands for rm j's xed capital investment. Just like households, rms have to pay
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The pricing kernel tB
t is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer budget constraint (in real
terms). That is, the rm discounts its prots at the marginal utility of dividends on the consumer
side.
2.4 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is:
Yt = Nt + Id;t + P
e











enter the production function.
72.5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with interest rate persistence. We model the Taylor rule in
a sightly more general way as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), to accommodate more general
interest rate rules. Specically, we allow the central bank to use not just core in
ation t = Pt
Pt 1
but also headline in
ation in its interest rate rule. Notice that we can express headline CPI as:

HL









t 1 is the price change of the relative energy price and e =
PeEh
N+Id+PeEh is the steady
state share of of energy expenditures for consumers. Also notice that in the steady state, only
the nominal price Pt grows at a positive rate, not the relative energy price P e; therefore  e = 0.
Then we use the generalized Taylor rule with an additional term for energy price in
ation:
Rt    R = r
 
Rt 1    R











Yt    Y

(33)
This setup is similar in spirit to Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) who add an extra term for
the asset price to study the role of monetary policy in response to asset price shocks. Notice that
with this equations we can accommodate a wide variety of Taylor rules. The rule used in Leduc
and Sill (2004) is a special case if we set e





the rule is equivalent to one where the central bank puts weight HL
 on headline in
ation.
3 Calibration and Estimation
A summary of all estimated and calibrated parameters is in Table 1.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Households Firms Central Bank Shocks
 0:9900  0:3600 r 0:7900 zy;t = zzy;t 1 + "z;t
w 3:0000 f 11:0000 core
 1:8000 z 0.9500
h  3:0000 f  0:7000 e
 0:0000 2
z 0.0070
w 23:0766 p 115:3829 y 0:2700
d 11:6305 k 144:9298  R 0:0150 pt = 1
ppt 1 + "p;t + 2
p"p;t 1
h 1:5824  10 5 f 0:9955 1
p 0.9753






83.1 Preferences and technology
One model period corresponds to one quarter, so we set the discount rate  at 0:99 as is standard
in the literature. We also choose a labor share of 64 percent, thus  = 0:36: Both parameters 
and  will remain unchanged for all the model specications we consider in this paper.
We choose the same w;f parameters that govern the market power of rms and workers as
in Huang et.al (2004) : w = 3; and f = 11: Furthermore, we pick the same CES parameter
in the production function (h =  0:7) as in Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan and Jeske
(2006). We also set the household CES parameter to h =  3:0, which Dhawan and Jeske found
to match the volatility of household energy consumption in the data very well.
Next, in Table 2 we specify six moments observed in the data that our model is supposed
to replicate. We refer to Dhawan and Jeske (2006) for the details on how we computed these
moments.9 The target moments pin down six more parameters h, 
, f, d, k and '. Appendix
Section C has all the details.








Based on Dhawan and Jeske (2006).
3.2 Monetary Policy
For the benchmark case we use the same parameters as in Leduc and Sill (2004), based on
Orphanides (2001). Thus we set r = 0:79, core
 = 1:80, e
 = 0:00, and y = 0:27. Moreover,
since we target a steady state core in
ation rate of about 2 percent per year, we set  R = 1:015.
We will also consider alternative parameterizations of this monetary policy rule in Section 4.2.
9Implicit in these targeted moments is the assumption that housing is part of the xed capital stock K, not
the durable goods stock D. This is because the housing stock produces housing services (both rental and owner-
occupied), that are part of output. Our view therefore is that electricity and natural gas use are complementary
to to the durable goods installed in residential structures (such as refrigerators, heaters, air conditioning etc.),
not the housing services.
93.3 Shocks
Just as Cooley and Prescott (1995), we assume that log-TFP follows an AR(1) process:
zy;t = zzy;t 1 + "z;t (34)
where z = 0:95 and "z;t
iid  N (0;2
z) with z = 0:007:
We assume that the energy price follows an ARMA(1,1) process:
pt = 
1










and use the same estimates as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006), reported in Table 3.
Table 3: ARMA(1,1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results






From Dhawan and Jeske (2006).
3.4 Adjustment costs
Note that the model with adjustment costs generates the Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve:
t = Et+1 +
f   1
p 2 mct (36)
where mct is marginal cost. This is the same structure as under Calvo pricing where we get:
t = Et+1 +
(1   )(1   )

mct (37)
and  is the probability of not adjusting prices. We pick the parameters for the adjustment costs
for rms and workers in order to generate the same level of rigidity as in a Calvo price setting
with an average contract length of four quarters. This is the commonly used contract length in
the literature.10 We nd that on the rm side:
p = 115:3829
10See, for example Erceg et. al. (2000).
10and likewise for workers
w = 23:0766
yield nominal rigidities equivalent to Calvo price setting rules with an average contract length of
four quarters.
As Dhawan and Jeske (2006) point out, without adjustment costs on durables and xed
capital investment, we generate unrealistically large investment responses to an energy price
shock. Naturally, the adjustment costs cannot be calibrated from steady state moments, because
they are zero in steady state. Rather, we have to use out-of-steady-state observations to estimate
these parameters. Specically, we use the same methodology as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006):
we simulate the economy and set the adjustment cost parameters in order to match the second
moments of the investment serios for durable and xed investment which we found to be
We found that between 1970Q1 and 2006Q4 the volatility of HP-ltered investment were
0:0449 and 0:0526 for durables and xed investment, respectively. We nd that with
d = 11:6305
k = 144:9298
our model subjected to the TFP and energy price shocks generates exactly those volatilities.
To get a sense of the size of these adjustment costs we simulate an economy with 200,000
quarters and compute the ratios of adjustment costs over output. We report the results in
Table 4. Relative to output, the adjustment costs are small, especially for durables and xed
investment:
Table 4: Adjustment costs to output ratios (in percent)





















t =Yt 0.6489 0.9194 2.4842
4 Results
4.1 Benchmark
We use the stochastic perturbation method, i.e., log-linearization around the steady state, to
approximate the dynamics of our economy. From the rst order conditions in Appendix A, we
11derive 23 equations guiding the dynamic behavior of the economy. We then run the program
Dynare Version 3.0 to generate a rst order approximation for the policy functions (see Collard
and Juillard (2001) for the methodological details).
In Figure 2, we study the eects a doubling of the energy price. Due to the ARMA(1,1)
structure the peak in the energy price occurs in the second period after the shock.11 We nd
that in this economy, output drops by about 4:3 percent in quarter 4. In
ation peaks at about
1:7 percent in the rst period and then slowly decays over an extended period. Even after 40
quarters in
ation is still at 0:7 percent above steady state. The federal funds rate jumps by about
1:0 percentage points and persistently stays above its steady state level. In fact, the interest rate
is the most persistent among all series because it is not only responding to the persistent in
ation
shock, but also has additional persistence built in through the term r = 0:79 in the Taylor rule.
The reason for the persistence in in
ation is that the energy price shock causes a persistent
increase in marginal cost for the rm. According to equation (36), in
ation is the discounted
sum of future marginal costs. The higher energy price has a direct eect on marginal cost. On
top of that, the higher federal funds rate increases the costs for the labor input, which accounts
for 64 percent of output. Thus, higher labor cost increase the marginal cost substantially.
Finally, as pointed out in Dhawan and Jeske (2006), the investment series display a rebal-
ancing eect, whereby the response of durables investment is stronger than the drop in xed
investment.12 Specically, durables investment drops sharply in the rst period and xed invest-
ment increases in the rst quarter before dropping into negative territory.
4.2 Alternative monetary policy rules
Instead of solving for \the" optimal monetary policy as in Erceg et. al. (2000), we study
the eect of the benchmark and four variations of the monetary policy rule to determine their
relative success in cushioning the eect from the hike in energy prices and their impact on
in
ation. In particular, we keep the interest rate persistence parameter r constant at 0:79 and
study alternative values for the parameters core
 , e
 and y.13
Rule 1 - Benchmark: We use the benchmark Taylor rule as specied above: core
 = 1:80;
e
 = 0:00 and y = 0:27 as in Leduc and Sill (2004).
11Also notice that the impulse responses are in terms of log deviations from steady state, thus a 100 percent
increase in Pe corresponds to a log deviation of only 0.6931, not 1.0000.
12Notice that in Dhawan and Jeske it was the household who made both the durable and xed investment
decision. In our current economy xed investment is done by the rm and durables investment is done by the
household, so strictly speaking it is not a rebalancing of a portfolio because the two capital stocks are held by
dierent agents. We use the phrase \rebalancing" from an economy-wide view.
13This is again similar to the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001). Their work deals with asset rather
than energy price shocks, but they, too, analyze the eects of changing the parameters in their generalized Taylor
rule.
12Rule 2 - Use headline in
ation: This means we keep core







where e is the steady state household energy purchases as a share of total household expendi-
tures. In our calibration e = 0:0556, so we set:

e
 = 0:0556  1:8 = 0:1002
Rule 3 - Accommodate energy in
ation: Notice that we can also generate interest rate
rules where the central bank \accommodates" the energy price shock. Specically, we can set
the energy in
ation weight to a negative number.14 We keep core
 = 1:80 as in the baseline, but
use a weight on the energy price changes of e
 =  0:1002.
Rule 4 - Lower weight on core in




Rule 5 - Higher weight on the output gap: We increase the coecient on the output gap:
y = 0:35.
Simulating the our economy under the alternative specications for the Taylor rule, we did
not encounter any problems with indeterminacy. This result is consistent with Carlsrom et. al.
(2006) who showed, albeit in a slightly dierent model setup, that the Taylor principle is robust
to using dierent denitions of in
ation, namely core CPI or headline CPI. What is noteworthy,
though, is that even with a negative weight on the energy portion of in
ation, as under Rule 3,
our equilibrium is still determinate.
Table 5 summarizes the alternative monetary policy rules we study. We plot the impulse
response functions for output, in
ation and the federal funds rate under the benchmark and the
four alternative monetary policy rules in Figure 3.
We nd that a central bank that uses headline in
ation in the Taylor rule (Rule 2) causes a
large drop in output, almost 9 percent in the rst quarter. Over the whole transition, output is
the lowest among the ve policy rules we consider. In the rst period, in
ation is indeed slightly
lower than in the benchmark but then it stays persistently above the benchmark level. The
federal funds rate is above that in the under the Benchmark Taylor rule.
If the central bank accommodates the energy price shock through a negative weight on energy
14Notice that e
t is the gross increase in the energy price relative to the core basket of goods, not the nominal
gross increase in energy prices which would be e
t  t. In the remainder of the paper when we refer to energy
price in
ation, we mean the change in the energy price relative to the core goods, i.e., e
t.




Rule 1 Benchmark 1:8000 0:0000 0:2700
Rule 2 Use headline in
ation 1:8000 0:1002 0:2700
Rule 3 Accommodate energy in
ation 1:8000  0:1002 0:2700
Rule 4 Lower weight on core in
ation 1:5000 0:0000 0:2700
Rule 5 Higher weight on the output gap 1:8000 0:0000 0:3500
Note: We keep the persistence parameter r at the baseline level of 0:79 for all alternative
policy rules.
price in
ation (Rule 3), output stays above the steady state level for two quarters before dropping
into negative territory.15 Along the transition path back to the steady state, output is consistently
above that of the benchmark Taylor rule. Core in
ation spikes at about 2 percent above steady
state, though for one period only. After that, in
ation is the lowest among the ve policy rules.
With regards to monetary policy, despite higher core in
ation in the rst period, the federal
funds rate barely increases due to the negative weight on energy in
ation. After that both the
interest rate persistence and the low core in
ation keep the federal funds rate the lowest among
the ve policy rules.
Finally, we nd that putting a low weight on core in
ation (Rule 4) or a high weight on
the output gap (Rule 5) cushions the output drop. In fact, in both cases output even increases
slightly in the rst quarter. But these two rules also cause higher core in
ation and federal funds
rates.
We conclude that in this economy using headline in
ation in the Taylor rule is inferior both
in terms of the output loss and core in
ation. Altering the coecients on core in
ation and the
output gap poses a tradeo between in
ation and output. Rule 3, which accommodates energy
price shocks through a negative weight on the energy in
ation component, is therefore unique
in that it cushions both in
ation and the output loss. In other words, the central bank can
accommodate the energy price shock without trading o higher in
ation for it.
How is it possible that the central bank can get something for nothing? As Dhawan and
Jeske (2006) point out, the rebalancing of durable and xed capital plays a key role in the
response to energy price shocks. We can show that dierent monetary policy rules have dierent
eects on this rebalancing. In Figure 4 we plot the two investment series under three alternative
specications for the Taylor rule: The benchmark (Rule 1), using headline in
ation (Rule 2) and
Accommodating energy in
ation (Rule 3). We nd that the Taylor rule with headline in
ation
discourages rebalancing. Both IRFs are lower than under the benchmark but the eect is much
15This outcome is similar to that in the experiment in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006a), who show that if the
central bank accommodates the energy price shock for four quarters, output actually increases temporarily.
14stronger for xed investment. Going from Rule 1 to Rule 2 causes a drop in the xed investment
IRF by about 40 percentage points in the rst quarter, while the eect is only about 15 percentage
points for durables investment.
In contrast, going from Rule 1 to Rule 3 encourages rebalancing. Fixed investment is much
higher than under the benchmark Taylor rule. Intriguingly, even durables investment drops less
than under the benchmark Taylor rule. This is clearly due to the the income eect because
output is a lot higher under Rule 3.
Why does Rule 3 encourage rebalancing in favor of xed investment and ultimately a lower
output loss? We take a closer look at the impulse response functions under Rule 3. There are
multiple channels at work. First, the spike in core in
ation, which is more pronounced under
Rule 3 than under Rules 1 and 2, causes a more negative wealth eect for households who hold
the nominal money balance at the beginning of the period. Because of the cash in advance
constraint, households have to nance their consumption of N, Eh and Id out of the lower real
money balance, while at the same time facing higher energy prices. Also notice that while
deposits pay an above steady state interest rate, the federal funds rate under Taylor rule 3 is
still far below those under Rules 1 and 2, see Figure 3 lower panel. Faced with a negative wealth
eect from both high in
ation and relatively low deposit rates, households are encouraged to
reduce their durable goods consumption.
A side eect of the negative wealth eect is that households work more during the initial
two quarters. See Figure 5 where we plot the response to the doubling in the energy price in
hours and the wage. Under Rule 3 we observe the largest increase in hours in the initial periods.
The drop in the real wage W in the rst quarter is also more pronounced under Rule 3. This is
because of the spike in in
ation. Households have a harder time time passing on the core price
increase into higher wages because of the nominal rigidity. After the initial period however, the
wage under Rule 3, while below steady state, stays above that under Rules 1 and 2. This is
clearly due to smaller drop in the xed capital stock along the transition path which makes labor
more productive.
For rms the increase in the energy price has a negative eect, but under Rule 3 it is cush-
ioned substantially. The large increase in hours coupled with lower wages makes capital more
productive. Indeed the increase in labor input more than makes up for the decline in rm energy
use to cause an initial spike in xed investment. A higher federal funds rate means higher costs
to nance the wage bill, but notice that the federal funds rate increases only mildly in the rst
two quarters, only about a quarter percentage point and thus much less than under the other
Taylor rules. The lower wage more than compensates for that.
154.3 Robustness check
In this section we study how our results change under dierent specications of the basic model
structure. Specically, we perform robustness analysis with respect to the parameters outside of
the Taylor rule, for example the persistence of the energy price shock or the degree of nominal
rigidities. We consider a total of seven calibrations (including the benchmark calibration) and
in each case study the ve dierent Taylor rule parameterizations outlined in Subsection 4.2.
Thus, we solve for impulse response functions in a total of 35 dierent economies and in each
case compare both the cumulative output loss and the impact on in
ation.




t=1 t 1 (exp(~ yt)   1)
P1




t 1 (exp(~ yt)   1) (38)
where ~ yt is the impulse response function, i.e., the log deviation from the steady state. One can
think of Ly as translating the time-varying output loss in the impulse response function into one
constant permanent loss in every period. We present the results in Table 6, where the columns
correspond to the alternative monetary policy rules. The rst column is the benchmark Taylor
rule and the four additional columns are for the alternative parameterizations, as discussed in
Subsection 4.2. The rows correspond to alternative calibrations. The rst row is for the bench-
mark model calibration, as detailed in Section 3 and the other rows are for the ve alternative
calibrations discussed below.
We also compare the in
ation path across the dierent calibrations and Taylor rules. Our









where ~ t is the in
ation log-deviation from its steady state. The term PL is the total change in
the price level due to the energy price shock and subsequent monetary policy response. In other
words, 1 + PL is the factor by which we multiply the exponentially growing price level in an
economy without an energy price shock. We report these results in Table 7.
Since our main focus will be how accommodation of energy prices aects macroeconomic
outcomes, we also report the success of Rule 3 in reducing the output drop and the in
ation
impact relative to the benchmark Taylor rule 1. Specically, Table 8 reports how much lower
the output drop and in
ation impact are (in percent) if the central bank uses Rule 3 rather than
Rule 1.
As far as the benchmark calibration (row 1) is concerned, results on the cumulative output
16loss are consistent with the observations from the impulse responses; using headline in
ation
(Rule 2) causes a larger output loss than in the benchmark, whereas accommodating the energy
price shock (Rule 3) generates the lowest output loss, almost 12 percent below that under Rule
1. The output drop is lower than under the benchmark Taylor rule if the central bank is soft on
core in
ation (Rule 4) or puts a large weight on the output gap (Rule 5).
Clearly, the impact of energy price shocks is substantial. In the benchmark economy (row
1) with the benchmark Taylor rule (column 1), the price level will eventually be be about 73:76
percent larger than that in an economy without an energy price shock. Notice that as in the case
of the output drop, when comparing Rules 1, 2 and 3, the rules with lower weights on energy
price in
ation do better than those with higher weights. Most importantly, under Rule 3 the
impact on the price level is about 11 percent lower than under benchmark Taylor rule. Rules 4
and 5 cause a larger increase in the price level.
The results in the three tables about the benchmark calibration (row 1) are thus consistent
with the impulse response functions in gure 3: Comparing rules 1 through 3 we nd that the
lower the weight on energy in
ation, the lower the impact on both in
ation and the output
drop. Comparing Rule 1 with Rules 4 and 5 we nd that there is a tradeo between output and
in
ation. Specically, both rules 4 and 5 are able to cushion the output drop but at the cost of
higher in
ation.
To see how robust our results are we study the output drop and the permanent eect on the
price level in economies where we change parameters other than those in the Taylor rule. In
each case we recalibrate the adjustment cost parameters d and k to match the observed second
moments of the investment series.16
Simple household problem - no durables and no household energy use: First, we
replicate the result from Dhawan and Jeske (2006) that durable goods and household energy use
matter: The output drop in the economy with the simple household problem is larger than under
the benchmark where we explicitly model household energy use and durable goods. Moreover,
comparing Rules 1, 2 and 3, the cumulative output drop is roughly the same whether the central
bank uses core CPI, headline CPI or a negative weight on energy in
ation. This is in line with
Figure 4, where we learned that dierent monetary rules have dierent eects on the rebalancing
between durables and xed capital investment. Shutting down this rebalancing channel, we lose
the dierential impact of the alternative Taylor rules in columns 2 and 3.
No wage rigidity: Without wage rigidity the cumulative impact on output is larger than
under the benchmark calibration. The ordering in output losses and in
ation impact between
16One exception is an economy without durable goods where we match the volatility of xed investment only.
17rules 1 through 3 is unchanged, though. As before, Rule 2 performs the worst among these three
rules and Rule 3 performs the best. What does change between the benchmark calibration and
the economy without wage rigidity is that now the output drop under rules 4 and 5 is larger than
under the benchmark Taylor rule. There is no tradeo any more: Being easy on core in
ation
(Rule 4) of the output gap (Rule 5) exacerbates the output drop and causes more in
ation. This
is the same result as in Leduc and Sill (2004) who showed that lower weights on core in
ation
or higher weights on the output gap cause larger output drops and higher in
ation than in the
benchmark Taylor rule.
No price rigidity: Qualitatively the results are the same as in the case of no wage rigidity.
The ordering between rules 1 through 3 is the same as before and rules 4 and 5 cause larger
output drops and in
ation.
No wage, no price rigidity: Without any nominal rigidities, i.e., with zero adjustment costs
for both wages and prices we maintain the ordering between Rules 1 through 3 for both output
drop and in
ation.
We also nd that rules 4 and 5 are most damaging in the economy without nominal rigidities.
Notice that this economy is most similar to that of Leduc and Sill (2004). Their nominal rigidities
were essentially equal to zero. For example their price adjustment cost parameter p corresponded
to Calvo contracts with a length of 1.02 quarters, or alternatively, 98 percent of all rms change
prices every quarter. In our economy, therefore, we replicate their result that rules 4 and 5 are
inferior with respect to both output and in
ation.
Dierent rm markups: We also check how dierent values for f change our results. The
benchmark value of f = 11 generates a rm markup of p = 1
f 1 = 0:10. Other studies found
the markup to be in the range  2 [0:05;0:20]:17 We thus simulate the economy for f = 6
and f = 21. The results are again consistent with those in the benchmark. Most importantly,
headline in
ation in the Taylor rule (Rule 2) causes a larger output drop and more in
ation and
accommodating energy in
ation (Rule 3) causes a lower output drop and less in
ation than in
the benchmark.
Our robustness analysis shows that along a wide variety of alternative calibrations, the lower
the weight on energy in
ation in the Taylor rule the lower is the output drop and the in
ation
impact. Specically, using headline in
ation, which implies a positive weight on energy price
in
ation, exacerbates the output loss and in
ation impact relative to the benchmark Rule 1, while
17See Huang et. al. (2004). Christiano et. al. (2005) use a markup of 0.20. Basu and Fernald (2000) nd a
markup of 0.05.
18Table 6: Cumulative Output Loss (in percent) under dierent modeling assumptions and mone-
tary policy rules.
Monetary Policy
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5
benchmark calibration 1.4922 1.6597 1.3141 1.3742 1.4404
no D;Eh 1.5766 1.5783 1.5750 1.4484 1.5251
no wage rigidity 1.9144 2.1079 1.7139 2.2592 2.1050
no price rigidity 1.7428 1.8974 1.5852 1.8119 1.7885
no wage, no price rigidity 2.2191 2.3172 2.1208 3.4444 2.7250
f = 6 1.6448 1.8017 1.4797 1.5265 1.5952
f = 21 1.4128 1.5861 1.2275 1.2966 1.3607
Table 7: Permanent change in the price level as a multiple of an economy without an energy
price shock
Monetary Policy
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5
benchmark calibration 0.7376 0.8195 0.6557 1.0602 0.9193
no D;Eh 0.7865 0.7873 0.7857 1.1265 0.9803
no wage rigidity 1.0025 1.1099 0.8952 1.8741 1.4319
no price rigidity 0.8778 0.9691 0.7865 1.4098 1.1606
no wage, no price rigidity 1.2246 1.3189 1.1304 3.0998 1.9800
f = 6 0.8269 0.9065 0.7473 1.1943 1.0337
f = 21 0.6930 0.7762 0.6097 0.9941 0.8626
Note: A value of 0:8195 in row 1, column 2 means that in the benchmark calibration with the
Taylor rule 2 (with headline in
ation), a doubling of the energy price drives the core price level
81:95 percent higher in the long term.
Rule 3, which accommodates energy price in
ation, cushions the drop and the price increase.
This result seems to come mainly from the rebalancing eect, because the only case in which
the choice of the in
ation measure in the Taylor rule does not matter much, is when the model
lacks the choice between durable and xed investment.
We also conrm Leduc and Sill's (2004) result that with low levels of nominal rigidities the
central bank exacerbates the output loss following an energy price hike by choosing a low weight
on core in
ation or a high weight on the output gap. However, we show that this result is not all
that robust. For higher levels of nominal rigidities we can reverse this nding. Specically, if we
use adjustment cost parameters that correspond to commonly used degrees of Calvo-type price
stickiness { price and wage adjustments are done on average only every four quarters { we nd
that a central bank accommodating an energy price hike can cushion the output drop, though
at the cost of a higher increase in the price level.
19Table 8: Percentage Reduction of the output loss and price level impact if the central bank
accommodates energy in
ation (Rule 3) relative to benchmark Taylor rule
Output drop Impact on price level
benchmark calibration 11.93 11.11
no D;Eh 0.11 0.11
no wage rigidity 10.47 10.71
no price rigidity 9.04 10.40
no wage, no price rigidity 4.43 7.70
f = 6 10.03 9.63
f = 21 13.11 12.01
5 Conclusion
Which in
ation measure should the central bank focus on in its Taylor rule, core or headline?
To answer this question we clearly need a model with energy price shocks, since a large part of
the dierence between the two measures comes from the volatile energy price series. We set up
a model with money, durable goods, nominal rigidities and energy price shocks to study how the
economy behaves under dierent monetary policy rules after being subjected to an energy price
hike. Specically, we allow a generalized functional form for the Taylor rule that includes a term
for energy price in
ation in addition to core in
ation and the output gap. Clearly, a central bank
using headline in
ation is a special case of this rule.
A negative weight on energy price in
ation, which we view as accommodating the energy
price shock, cushions the output drop while actually allowing a lower price increase than under
the benchmark Taylor rule. We conclude that a central bank can in fact accommodate an energy
price shock, as long as the accommodation refers to energy prices only, while still being vigilant
on core in
ation. Conversely, using headline in
ation in a Taylor rule appears to be a bad
idea, both in terms of the output drop and the in
ation impact. This result is robust along a
wide variety of alternative calibrations. Only in the absence of household durable goods would
the weight on energy price in
ation be irrelevant. This indicates that the rebalancing between
durable and xed capital investment plays the key role in explaining the dierential impacts of
monetary policy. Thus, we found a new application of the rebalancing eect of Dhawan and
Jeske (2006), namely in the transmission of monetary policy following an energy price shock.
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22Figure 1: VAR impulse responses to an energy price shock (in percent)



















































Note: Data cover quarters 1970:1-2006:4. The dashed lines are the 68 percent Sims and Zha
(1999) error bands.
23Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a doubling of the energy price shock in the benchmark




















































24Figure 3: Model impulse responses to a doubling in the energy price: Alternative Policy Rules


























Rule 2: Use headline inflation
Rule 3: Accommodate energy inflation
Rule 4: Lower weight on core inflation
Rule 5: Higher weight on the output gap
25Figure 4: Model impulse responses to a doubling in the energy price: Investment Series under
Alternative Policy Rules

























Rule 2: Use headline inflation
Rule 3: Accommodate energy inflation
26Figure 5: Model impulse responses to a doubling in the energy price: Alternative Policy Rules













Rule 2: Use headline inflation
Rule 3: Accommodate energy inflation












A First order conditions:
A.1 Consumer
In the rst order conditions we skip the expectation operator when referring to t + 1 variables

































































i;t [Id;i;t + (1   d)Di;t 1   Di;t]





















































































































































































 Plus the constraints and the denition of CA.
We can assume that in a symmetric equilibrium Wi;t = Wt;Hi;t = Ht;Ni;t = Nt and so on.

































































































































 Cash in advance:









 Denition of durables investment:


















The derivative of revenue Yj;tY
1=f



















































t   WtHj;tRt   Ik;j;t   P
e



















































































































 Denition of investment:
Kj;t = (1   k)Kj;t 1 + Ik;j;t (A-29)
 Denition of prots:
j;t = Yj;tY
1=f
t   WtHj;tRt   Ik;j;t   P
e









1   1=f +
p
f
(t    )t  
p
2






















(1   1=f) +
p
f
(t+1    )t+1  
p
2


































1   1=f +
p
f
(t    )t  
p
2































t = Yt   WtHtRt   Ik;t   P
e
















































































































































































































































































 Budget Constraint: Write rm prots as:

f
t = Yt   WtHtRt   Ik;t   P
e
t Ef;t   AC
k
t (Ik;t;Kt 1)   AC
p
t (Pt;Pt 1;Yt)
= Nt + Id;t + P
e





The intermediary's prot is equal to the money injection plus interest. The money injection
has to be dierence between the amount loaned out to the rm and the household deposits.
Thus, we can write the prot as:

b
t = Rt (PtWtHt   DPt)
Plug all of this and the cash in advance constraint into the budget constraint:
mt = mt 1
 1
t   (Nt + Id;t + P
e








+ (1 + Rt)WtHt
+Nt + Id;t + P
e








t   dpt + WtHt (A-42)
 Cash in advance:
Nt + Id;t + P
e
t Eh;t = mt 1
 1
t   dpt (A-43)
 Denition of durables investment:




























33 Marginal Product of Labor:
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i;t+1 (1   k) (A-51)
 Capital Law of Motion:
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 Aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Nt + Id;t + Ik;t + P
e










Yt = Nt + Id;t + Ik;t + P
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Rt   R = r (Rt 1   R) + (1   r) (t    ) + (1   r)y
 
Yt    Y

(A-58)
We have the following variables:








 9 Production variables:
Z;Y;MPL;MPK;MPE;Ik;K;Ef;
F
23 variables and 23 equations
B Construct steady state


























































  dp + WH (B-7)
 Cash in advance:





 Durables law of motion:




















 Marginal Product of Labor:
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MPK + 1   

(B-16)
 Capital law of motion:
Ik = kK
 Energy:








 Aggregate resource constraint:
Y = N + Id + Ik + P
e (Eh + Ef) (B-19)
Start cranking From the Capital Euler equation (B-16) and Firm Energy equation (B-17):
MPK =
1
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(1   f) (B-24)
Call Ef 
Ef





kefEf + (1   f)Ef





kef + (1   f)













































Then through equations (B-12) and (B-15) we get the steady state wage
W =
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h 1 + (1   d) (B-33)
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D + d + P e Eh
D
(B-39)
Notice that so far we have not used a particular functional form for the utility function. Now we





































































































































Also, from the money/deposits Euler equation
 = R (B-50)
and from there all the other variables via their output ratios. We compute real deposits and real
money holdings via:
m = N + Id + P




  m + WH (B-52)











We set targets for steady state values of ratios Eh=Y , Id=Y , D=Y , Ef=Y , K=Y and hours worked
H: We use these targets to pin down six parameters h;
;f;d;k;':
From the rm energy use equation (B-17):
P
e = (1   1=f)Y
 
fK
f + (1   f)E
f
f
 1 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Ef + (1   f)
 1 (1   f) (C-1)
This equation pins down f: This is the same root nding problem as in Dhawan and Jeske
(2006) but with the additional factor (1   1=f):


























































h 1 + (1   d) (C-5)
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D Partial Derivatives of adjustment cost functions
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Yt+2
Yt+1
MPKt+1 (D-19)
44